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The Lawyer's Independent Calling
By ARcHmBA Cox*
As a young man, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., desired to
live greatly. He hesitated to become a lawyer because he was
doubtful whether a man could live greatly within the law. Yet
when Mr. Justice Holmes was ninety, he told a friend that if
the ceiling should open and a great voice speak summoning
him to his Maker, he would reply, "I am ready, Lord, but may
I have ten more minutes."
Today, many thoughtful observers say that lawyers do not
and probably cannot "live greatly." During the Watergate in-
vestigations Richard Reeves wrote in New York magazine:
The point about lawyers ... is that they are free to commit
outrages against common morality and sense behind hal-
lowed and intricate shields, canons, and jargon.'
Other observers, some themselves members of the bar, fear
that constant, skilled, and zealous devotion to the interests of
their clients, no matter how morally questionable or narrowly
selfish, gradually blinds lawyers not only to the rights of others
but even to "right" and "wrong. ' 2 Such Watergate figures as
John Mitchell, John Erhlichman, Charles Colson, and John
Dean are cited as examples. A woman who had heard me make
a speech, in which I urged the substitution of public funds for
special interest money in financing political campaigns, wrote
this letter:
I submit to you, Professor Cox, that getting lawyers out of
politics is much more important than deciding who pays in
what fashion for [election] campaigns ....
A law professor told me recently that there are three basic
characteristics of lawyers a law school education has done
* Carl M. Leob University Professor, Harvard University. Professor Cox's re-
marks, delivered on October 19, 1978, at the University of Kentucky,.inaugurated the
Judge Mac Swinford Lecture Series.
IReeves, The Trouble with Lawyers: The Case of James St. Clair, NEw YoRK,
July 29, 1974, at 27.
1 See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS No. 1, 1, 10-11, 15 (1975).
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nothing to correct: (1) lawyers are generalists who really be-
lieve they know what is best for everybody; (2) lawyers are
technicians who make no moral judgments, who are hired to
hear a client's predicament and set to work figuring out the
techniques needed to extricate the client from his bind; (3)
lawyers going into government service carry with them their
technical, extricating competence and strict devotion to each
client's predicament, [and] cannot conceive of themselves
as serving "all" those people who make up the "public."
Are these appraisals justified? Is it still possible to live
greatly in the law? Or are we in truth no more than expensively
trained and highly competent "hired guns" available to the
highest bidder?
Much of the current criticism of the legal profession is
justified. We would be quite wrong to push it aside as no more
than the layman's ancient resentment of a learned profession.
We have done too little to confront the ethical problems pushed
to the front by changes in the character of a legal practice. Both
bench and bar are too slow to deal with abuses. Being human,
we have our individual failings. We excuse too much as loyalty
to clients. But when all this has been said, I am proud of our
profession and convinced that each of us can aspire to live
greatly in the law-whether he deals with large affairs or the
ordinary day-to-day lives of friends and neighbors.
I.
Ours is an open society dedicated to an extraordinarily
large measure of human liberty, not so much because of the
satisfaction of "doing one's own thing" as because freedom and
the accompanying responsibility permit a man to choose be-
tween right and wrong and thus to grow in the exercise of the
noblest human capacity.
The very notion of freedom in society involves inherent
contradiction. That we should all be free to choose and pursue
our own objectives makes differences of opinion and sharp
clashes of interest inescapable. That man is a social being -
that we are destined to live and work together dependent upon
each other for the progress of countless joint ventures and ulti-
mately for the progress of the whole human enterprise - re-
quires accommodations and especially constraints upon the
ways in which we pursue our rival objectives.
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In my view, the lawyer is the free society's expert in work-
ing out those necessary accommodations and constraints and
in creating and operating the procedures into which we channel
conflicts for at least temporary resolution. Every practicing
lawyer, whether he deals in constitutional issues, advice to
corporations, collective labor arguments, wills, or domestic re-
lations, is engaged in helping people to live together, pursuing
and achieving individual goals, with a minimum of force and
maximum of reason - helping substitute reason for power,
thus offering man's best hope of liberty, of mutual respect for
human dignity, and of change and progress.
II.
History is filled with examples of the creativity of lawyers
in helping people to live together.
The most creative acts in our political history were done
at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787. Apart from Washing-
ton and Franklin, the leading figures at the Convention were
all lawyers.
The economic base of our society depends in large measure
upon lawyers' ingenuity. Mass production, mass transporta-
tion, and mass consumption require pooled and borrowed capi-
tal and also consumer credit. The corporate form, stocks,
bonds, equipment trusts, and conditional sales, for example,
have become so familiar that it is as hard to understand the
inventiveness required to create these devices as it is in the case
of the wheel. Even though they are subject to gross abuse, we
could not do without these instruments of human cooperation
and organization. Few of them existed two hundred years ago.
Some lawyer had to have the imagination to conceive them.
Contemporary examples also abound. For decades, great
racial injustice flowed from the discriminatory use of literacy
tests. Fairly administered, literacy tests are constitutional.'
Unfairly administered, they become engines for violating the
fifteenth amendment's command that no person shall be de-
nied the right to vote by reason of race or color.' When the
Department of Justice proved a pattern or practice of using a
3Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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statutory literacy test as an engine of racial discrimination, the
federal court would bar the statute's further application.5 The
burden of investigation was time-consuming and enormously
expensive. During the investigation, the discriminatory use of
the test and the resulting racial injustice would continue. If
literacy tests themselves were constitutional, what could be
done? There was no easy answer.
After a time, a lawyer in the Department suggested shift-
ing the burden of delay during the long interval between filing
the complaint and the entry of the final judgment. Can we not
identify - he asked - a few simple, quickly ascertained facts
from which a probability of past misuse and therefore a signifi-
cant risk of continuing misuse could be inferred, then provide
by statute that a temporary injunction pendente lite shall issue
upon establishing those few facts unless the defendant officials
can disprove the inference? Where is the constitutional
authority? Let the power to "enforce" the fifteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against racial discrimination be read with
the breadth given the "necessary and proper" clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland' so as to cover the elimination of signif-
icant risks of violation - at least pending a full trial of the
facts. Judges have long stood ready to enjoin acts - which were
lawful standing alone - when they had been parts of an unlaw-
ful course of action.7 The kernel of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 lies in these suggestions.' The Act removed a grave na-
tional injustice, and it had elements of creativity.
In the field of industrial relations, the arrangement which
we now call a "maintenance of membership clause" is a dra-
matic example of creative accommodation worked out by law-
yerly reasoning. During World War I, efforts to build coopera-
tion between unions and management broke down over organ-
ized labor's demand for the "closed shop"-that is, the de-
mand for management's promise in each collective bargaining
agreement not to employ anyone not a member of the labor
5 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128 (1965).
* 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
'E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Warner & Co. v. Lilly
& Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970). The constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was sustained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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union. In 1941 the National Defense Mediation Board was de-
stroyed by the resignation of the labor members following the
Board's refusal to award the United Mine Workers the closed
or union shop in "captive" coal mines. Efforts to re-establish
a tripartite board for the peaceful solution of labor disputes in
the wake of Pearl Harbor seemed about to founder upon the
same reef until a Rooseveltian sleight-of-hand put the issue in
the hands of a War Labor Board for case-by-case determina-
tion. The unions continued to press for the security of assured
membership, majority status, and an assured flow of dues;
these, they said, would together enable them to act with re-
straint and a sense of public responsibility during the wartime
crisis. Management replied that the fundamental human right
of freedom of association implies freedom not to associate,
which includes freedom not to join a labor union. Management
spokesmen went on to insist that a society embarking on a war
for freedom should not force employers to violate this funda-
mental human right of employees by threat of discharge. The
impasse seemed insoluble.
The first step towards resolution came when a wise and
ingenious lawyer suggested that the freedom to contract and
the right to rely upon a contractual undertaking once made
where scarcely less fundamental than freedom of association or
non-association. What principled objection could there be to
requiring a man who had voluntarily joined a labor union to
contract that he would maintain his membership for a fixed
period, that is, for the duration of the collective bargaining
agreement between his employer and the union? The reply was
that when the employee joined the union he did not know that
he was undertaking a binding contractual commitment. That
point was met by provision for notice and a ten day period at
the start of each agreement, during which each employee could
choose between dropping or staying out of the labor union or
giving an implied enforceable contractual commitment to re-
main a member for the duration of the agreement. The upshot
proved to be a viable compromise that kept the War Labor
Board in operation and enabled unions and employers to carry
on together.
As in other human controversies, neither the problem nor
the pressures making for compromise were wholly intellectual.
1978-791
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Each side had economic and political clout. Each needed and
knew that it needed the other. Both feared public reprisals if
the gulf were not bridged. Public Board members could keep
impressing these pressures upon the protagonists but these
pressures alone would not produce agreement. It took the close
and imaginative analysis in which the best lawyers specialize
to find the accommodation which would grant the point most
strenuously pressed by management, yet also satisfy what the
unions thought were their most pressing needs.
The maintenance of membership clause is only one of
many examples of lawyers' creativity in the field of industrial
relations. The organization of labor unions and the develop-
ment of collective bargaining in the United States have been
encouraged and structured by law, unlike the evolution in
Great Britain where law was rigidly excluded. Here, lawyers
played important roles, and the resulting mix of law and free
collective bargaining proliferated an extraordinary variety of
forms of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and factfinding;
of grievance and arbitration procedures; and of such diverse
instruments as the AFL-CIO no-raiding pact, the Building and
Construction Industry's National Joint Board for the Settle-
ment of Jurisdiction Disputes, the human relations committees
at Kaiser and U. S. Steel, and the Public Review Boards of the
Upholsters' Union and the United Automobile Workers, all of
which secured the rights of individual union members against
over-reaching by union officials. By these means the clash be-
tween management and labor was softened and the common
enterprises - on which management and labor and the public
all depend - moved forward. A greater measure of industrial
justice was brought into the mine, mill, and factory. Opportun-
ities to share in the governance of industrial life were also in-
creased for all workers - through chosen representatives -
and for the able and energetic - by direct participation as shop
steward, union officer or member of a specialized joint labor-
management committee. The negotiated procedures had to be
fitted into the surrounding legal structure.' Gradually, lawyers
and collective bargaining produced an extraordinary blend of
I See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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law and private, voluntary, do-it-yourself instruments of ac-
commodation and responsible self-government.
I choose and stress this example because it may be sugges-
tive in thinking about one of the greatest problems facing the
legal profession. What is to be done about our overburdened
courts, crowded dockets, and ever longer delays? Better organi-
zation and management will do something, but I fear not
enough. What is to be done about the mounting expense of
litigation? What of the tendency to turn more and more human
problems into lawsuits? Perhaps the greatest challenge we face
is to find other, better, and cheaper solutions not only to civil
controversies but for dealing with minor criminal behavior -
solutions, I would hope, involving more participation and more
responsibility on the part of those most intimately affected.
III.
During the years when World War II and the reconstruc-
tion of Europe were challenging the finest minds to find new
vehicles for cooperation among the western allies in the face of
clashing interests, Jean Paul Monnet, the great French econo-
mist and statesman, asked an American friend:
Will you please explain to me why the men whom I regard as
the most effective - the most fruitful, the most creative -
are lawyers?
Part of the answer lies in the peculiar mix of human under-
standing and intellectual discipline that fills the lawyer's pro-
fessional life. The law's concerns are men and women, their
daily lives, their fears and aspirations, their mean pursuits and
high adventures. The great lawyer will know and understand
them almost better than they know themselves. The great law-
yer will be a dreamer too.
Still, these qualities are not confined to lawyers. Others
have dreams and human understanding. Nor are these alone
sufficient for the lawyer's role. The artist may see cathedrals
in the clouds but he cannot build even a church without know-
ing the capacities of stone and steel and bricks and mortar. The
lawyer may be the artist but he must also be the architect and
engineer of social, economic, and political organization. His
unique tools are the intellectual discipline, the constraints of
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
verbal accuracy and precise concept, the capacity for logical
development coupled with pragmatic attention to a specific
problem - skills which distinguish lawyers from many politi-
cal scientists and economists and which often vex the law stu-
dent. With these tools the lawyer also acquires a sense of relev-
ance that separates the essential from the trivial and the pri-
mary from the subordinate.
The lawyer is an expert in process and thus knows better
than others that conflicts of interest or principle - which seem
irreconcilable when abstractly stated - can be postponed and
accommodated in a step-by-step manner if a suitable proce-
dure is established into which to channel specific instances of
actual conflict.
Immersion in the development of existing law and institu-
tions is still another important source of creativity, even
though we must acknowledge that it makes some lawyers re-
sistant to change. Men can seldom sweep the chessmen off the
board and start afresh. Great changes more often flow from
adaptations that revolutionize gradually even though each step
alone seems not too inconsistent with the basic structure. Ap-
preciation of the past flow of lawyerly inventions gives a sense
of capacity which is itself creative.
The qualities which I have thus far mentioned will be only
"technical extricating competence""0 unless directed by a
larger vision. Here, the way in which the lawyer looks at him-
self becomes decisive. Does he see himself as a "hired gun" or
as the follower of an independent public calling? Does he see
himself as only a technician - a "professional" he might say
- who puts his knowledge of law and legal skills to whatever
use his client dictates? Or does he seem himself as also serving
larger interests? The lawyers whose work I have tried to suggest
had developed the capacity for taking a longer and broader
view than the first look of many clients who are engaged in
pressing immediate self-advantage. Independence kept them
free of the emotional involvement that confuses judgment. The
lawyer's habit of examining the implications of each step he
takes and each assertion he makes reminded them, and ena-
bled them to remind their clients, of the extent to which the
10 See the letter quoted at page 6 supra in the text.
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client's true long-range goals were bound up with standards of
decency and with the welfare not only of the other parties to
the immediate controversy but of wider segments of society.
Sometimes I think that the lawyer's role calls for a mea-
sure of ambivalence. The lawyer must constantly look to those
interests of his client which a free society allows the client to
pursue, but he must also look to the needs of the larger common
enterprises in which the client is engaged - ultimately to the
needs of the whole human enterprise of which the client is a
part. Often the two clash, either in truth or because the client's
interest, as perceived by the client, clashes with the lawyer's
but not the client's view of the public interest.
Plainly, it is for the client to choose after receiving the
lawyer's advice. That advice will be better service to the
client's interest if the lawyer preserves the independence neces-
sary to look both to what the client thinks he wants and to the
larger interests of others whom the client's action will affect,
including the general public. With the larger consequences be-
fore him, the client may change his view of what he wants, he
may separate out the main objective, thereby eliminating
cause for controversy or harm to others, or he may pursue the
same goal by a different method which likewise avoids or re-
duces injury. In truth, therefore, there is no real ambivalence.
Let me particularize again. Suppose that in 1970 a man
about to undergo surgery went into his lawyer's office and
asked the lawyer to draw him a will cutting off his only son
without a penny. The son, who was deeply and conscientiously
opposed to the war in Viet Nam, had gone to Canada to avoid
the draft, having been denied deferment as a conscientious
objector because he could not say that he was conscientiously
opposed to all war." The law professor whose article brought
this example to my attention observed that in the conventional
view the role-differentiated character of the lawyer's work
tends to render irrelevant such ordinary moral questions as
whether this is a very bad reason for disinheriting a child;
under this amoral, professional view, he wrote, the only job of
the lawyer is to draw the will - providing the competence that
the client lacks.12
" See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
2 Wasserstrom, supra note 2, at 6.
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I disagree. I doubt whether the typical lawyer takes this
limited view of his responsibility. If the father asks, "Can I cut
my son off without a penny?" the lawyer doubtless must an-
swer, "Yes, if you use the right words." If the client-father
replies, "Then do it," the lawyer's responsibility - in my view
- is not to begin drafting but, in words matching the intimacy
of their personal relationship, to remind the father of all the
unhappy implications of what he proposes, to speak of the son's
strength of character even though misdirected in the particular
instance, and to suggest that if the client were to die in surgery
and could return twenty years later, he would probably regret
his decision. I suspect that most lawyers would follow the latter
course and that such fathers take their advice despite the origi-
nal intention.
Consider one other example: A collective bargaining agree-
ment is to run from October 13, 1976 to October 31, 1979, but
the union has the right to reopen and renegotiate the wage scale
by giving not less than fifteen days written notice prior to Octo-
ber 31, 1978. The contract has a no-strike clause. The
employer-client received written notice from the union on
October 18. He comes to the lawyer chortling with happiness
because the union business agent had forgotten to mail his
letter two days earlier and the notice was untimely. "They have
no right to reopen, do they? I don't have to bargain, do I?" The
lawyer tells the client that he has no legal duty to bargain
about the wage scale. "They can't strike can they?" the client
asks. The lawyer would say that a strike would violate the
contract and might be an unfair labor practice.' 3 "Can you get
an injunction if they strike?" the employer asks. The answer
is "Possibly. There is some difficulty in enforcing a no-strike
clause by an injunction where there is no arbitrable contro-
versy."14 "Surely you could recover damages?" "Yes."
Such legal advice - using "legal" in a narrow sense - is
unexceptionable. Has the lawyer lived up to his professional
responsibility? Probably he has not violated any professional
code, but I would not think well of myself if I had done no more.
I should point out to the client the tremendous practical risks
, See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) National Labor Relations Act § 8(d)).
' See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
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that he takes in precipitating a strike that may severely injure
his business, not to mention his employees and perhaps the
whole community. I should go on to say that, even if there is
no strike, standing on the technical defect may cost the em-
ployer heavily in resentment, bad labor-management relations,
bad morale, and low productivity. I would see this not merely
as a duty attendant upon my independent calling but as part
of the obligation of loyalty to my client.
Of course, the client may not take the advice. He may be
perverse, short-sighted or bitterly antiunion. Or, since lawyers
have no monoply of wisdom, the client may be right. He may
know or believe with some reason that the particular union is
so corrupt that he must seize the occasion to fight when luck
gives him the tactical advantage. He may be in such deep
financial straits that the possibility of enforcing the letter of
the contract is the only hope of keeping the business alive. A
client's true interests are seldom wholly aligned with the in-
terests of those with whom he deals, and they may not con-
form at all closely with what you or I would take to be the
general interest. The gaps may be still wider as the client sees
his interests.
The lawyers whose creative work I so greatly admire were
loyally representing this kind of client. They were not the arbi-
trators, mediators, or neutral members of tripartite boards.
They did not have a neutral point of view. They were often
pushing not only the selfish material interests of a company or
of a union of employees but one of two clashing sets of opinion
as to where the public interest lies. Yet the best of them were
and still are constructive because they coupled with their
''extricating competence" the independence of the lawyer's
calling. They stood with their clients yet they stood enough
apart to remember better than their clients the general truth
which the historian George Bancroft wrote to the workingmen
of Northampton, Massachusetts, back in the time of Andrew
Jackson:
The feud between the capitalist and laborer, the House of
Have and the House of Want, is as old as social union and
can never be entirely quieted; but he who will act with mod-
eration, prefer fact to theory, and remember that everything
1978-79]
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in this world is relative and not absolute, will see that the
violence of the contest may be stilled.15
Happily, these lawyers had clients who understood this
idea when reminded, or who already understood it better than
their lawyers, and so directed their lawyers' skills to the com-
mon good.
IV.
Thus far I have said nothing of the advocate - the branch
of the profession which I know and love the best. Here the
lawyer is more often concerned with operating the existing sys-
tem for resolving adjudicable controversies than with creating
new procedures, even though we desperately need them. Here
too the epithet "hired gun" is most nearly applicable. It is not
for the lawyer in the courtroom to worry about the justice of
his client's cause; he is there to press the cause. His duty re-
quires him to pursue tactics which seem unfair to the layman
and offensive to any man of sensitivity, if they will serve his
client. If his client has been charged with rape, it may be his
duty to parade before the court the woman's previous sexual
experience. If he is cross-examining a witness who once com-
mitted felonies, it may be his duty to bring them out into the
open even though the convictions belong to a once-buried past
and the witness may suffer undeserved present injury. The
ultimate justification must be that the adversary system,
under which each lawyer single-mindedly promotes his client's
interests in the forum for resolving litigated disputes, achieves
greater justice than any other. If this be untrue, the system
should be changed. The fault is not with the individual lawyer
doing his part in making it operate as successfully as possible.
Even in the context of litigation, the responsible lawyer
has the repeated opportunity and the need to look beyond the
immediate battle to larger and wider interests.
Most obviously, he must avoid abuse of legal process. Dis-
covery, for example is often so time-consuming and financially
burdensome as to wear down a plaintiff with limited resources
and thus enable the defendant whose resources are large to
11 Boston Courier, Oct. 22, 1834.
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secure a far more favorable settlement that could be justified
on the merits. Perhaps the present rules concerning discovery
are unwise or unjust and should therefore be modified, but the
defendant's counsel has no obligation to hold back because of
the time consumed or the burden put on his opponent if he
honestly believes that the information which he seeks will ena-
ble him to conduct the courtroom defense more effectively. On
the other hand, loyalty to his client neither requires nor mor-
ally justifies delaying or burdening the opposing party solely for
the sake of forcing a favorable settlement.
Even at a trial the client's long range interests may be
injured by its lawyer's narrow devotion to winning the verdict.
The over-riding objective of the defendant charged with rape
is doubtless to secure acquittal and counsel must pursue every
lawful means, but some opponents in litigation must go home
and live together.
Suppose that an employer has discharged the president of
the local union. Counsel for the management discovers that the
union president had been' convicted of an exceedingly distaste-
ful and discreditable felony long before he went to work for the
employer. By combining this evidence with a skillful, bullying
cross-examination suggesting that the union president is an
inveterate liar, cheat, and troublemaker, counsel might sub-
stantially increase the likelihood of persuading the arbitrator
to uphold the discharge. He would also be proceeding - I ask
you to assume - in a way that the union president, his friends,
and fair-minded employees would think outrageously unfair
and demeaning to any human being. Surely trial counsel must
evaluate the risk of generating resentment quite beyond any
flowing from a fair defense of the discharge which would be
likely to poison future relations between management, union,
and employees even if the discharge is sustained. If the dis-
charge is not sustained, it will be almost impossible to achieve
cooperation with the union president. Perhaps the decision
would still be to fight with every weapon. My point is only that
the trial lawyer, like others, owes his client a duty to look
beyond the immediate combat to the client's long range inter-
ests, which usually include a reputation for decent behavior
and the promotion of some larger common enterprise.
Persuasive appellate advocacy also requires a lawyer to
1978-79]
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look at the controversy from an angle other than passionate,
short-run advocacy of the client's views. The single most seri-
ous mistake which I have observed in listening to many
hundreds of appellate arguments is the tendency to make the
argument which the lawyer thinks the client wants to hear, or
which expresses the client's ideology or emotions, instead of
facing up to the court's problem, which is the public problem,
and then showing the court how to solve its problem and still
render a decision favorable to the client's interest.
In the latter fashion counsel and court may be no less
creative than the lawyers I mentioned earlier. Sometimes the
vision may be grand, as in Daniel Webster's argument and
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.'" Some-
times a smaller bit of intellectual ingenuity permits shaping
the law to a new need or turning it from a blind alley, as Justice
Curtis did in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.'7 The desegregation
and reapportionment cases are more contemporary examples.'
V.
In speaking of the point of view from which the lawyer
should advise his clients, negotiate in their behalf, and conduct
litigation, I have approached but always skittered away from
the question: What of the lawyer whose client persists in a
wholly immoral course of conduct or one plainly and seriously
against the public interest? The narrow, embittered, and iras-
cible father may persist in disinheriting the son who followed
his conscience and thereby destroyed the father's mistaken
image. The employer may reject fair-minded, constructive pro-
posals for compromise with a responsible, democratically-run
union, which are plainly in his long-run interest, and choose
instead to take a strike in the hope of breaking the union -
without regard for the suffering which the strike will inflict
upon the employees and the community. What of the lawyer
in such a situation?
Perhaps a few things can be said with some assurance.
, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
" 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851). There was no hope for a sound resolution of the
debate over the negative implications of the Commerce Clause so long as the debate
focused upon the location of the power to regulate commerce.
'a E.g. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 843 (1954).
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1. The final decision is for the client. The lawyer's ques-
tion is whether he may or should withdraw.
2. The lawyer's duty to the legal system requires him -to
refrain from assisting a client to violate the criminal law's com-
mand.
Personally, I would lay down a higher standard. If an em-
ployer insists to his attorney that he will talk the union to death
before signing a collective bargaining agreement, or proposes to
discharge the most active union organizers, I would say that
the lawyer should not lend himself to the commission of those
patently unfair labor practices. I would apply the same rule to
plain violations of many public law commands because I think
that liberty depends upon the rule of law and the rule of law
ultimately depends upon voluntary compliance. I am told,
however, that the prevailing professional standard may toler-
ate helping a client to break civil law duties - to break a
contract, for example.
3. The lawyer's duty to the legal system sometimes re-
quires him to continue to represent a client whose conduct
deeply offends his own sensibilities. He cannot withdraw at a
time or in a way which will injure the client's interests. He may
be under a professional duty to defend a criminal case which
would otherwise be morally distasteful. A person charged with
crime is presumed innocent. The presumption carries a right
to a trial. The right to a trial implies a right to competent
representation. The public interest in the administration of
justice may therefore require a lawyer to represent an unpopu-
lar defendant.
I have grave doubt about how far a lawyer can invoke the
duty of single-minded loyalty to clients' interests as justifica-
tion for otherwise unworthy or questionable conduct outside
the courtroom in situations in which the lawyer is free to step
aside. The presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial
with the aid of competent counsel are not involved. Nor is the
adversary system. One can point out that the lawyer is a purve-
yor of a limited supply of professional services to which laymen
must have access in a society governed by an ever-growing,
complex, and technical mass of laws and regulations. From this
premise it can be argued that failure to fill the need would
result in lawyers imposing their moral standards or their sense
of the public interest upon individuals and enterprises in cir-
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cumstances in which society allows the individuals and enter-
prises freedom to press for what others think to be selfish or
immoral goals. Given the diversity of opinion among lawyers,
the danger of coercing such conformity seems small; moreover,
freedom from government is not a guaranty of freedom from
other pressures. In my opinion, it would make no contribution
to either the administration of justice or the democratic process
to give a lawyer an immunity from the kind of moral and politi-
cal judgments - the kind that laymen make all the time -
based upon his selection of clients or choice of tactics in pursu-
ing the client's business. The lawyer does not put aside human-
ity and duty to others upon entering the profession. He is free
to decide, and must decide, like any other person, to which
causes and clients he will devote time, energy, and expertise
and which, because of the offense to conscience, he will refuse.
How does one decide when to refuse?
At this point I must acknowledge a lack of experience. My
law has been practiced from the security of a professor's chair
or in government positions offering extraordinary independ-
ence. The Solicitor General and the lawyers in his office, for
example, are not only free to do so, but consider it their duty
to go before the Supreme Court of the United States and, con-
fessing erroi, to ask for a reversal of the judgment below when
satisfied that the defendant in a criminal case was unfairly
convicted or ought not to have been prosecuted. However, not
even the Solicitor General has the privilege of defending only
those positions which he would take if he were judge. He too is
part of the adversary system. If the government's position is
fairly arguable, both the government and the Court are entitled
to have him make, with openness and candor, the best argu-
ment he can.
In the 1960's Congress attached to the Post Office Appro-
priations Bill a rider prohibiting the Post Office from delivering
communist propaganda which came through the mails from
foreign countries, unless the addressee filed a written request
for the communist propaganda. The measure was challenged as
a violation of the first amendment. When the case reached the
Supreme Court,'9 it seemed to me and to all my staff that the
" Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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law was pretty plainly unconstitutional. Nevertheless, I argued
and defended the statute with all the power at my command.
It could not be said that there were no honest arguments to be
made in its support. Its wisdom or folly was scarcely relevant
to the litigation. Both the Congress and the Court were entitled
to have the strongest arguments presented for the Court's con-
sideration. The Congress was so entitled because legal forms
had cast the challenge in the form of a suit against the Post-
master General and for the Postmaster General's usual advo-
cate to withdraw was to display belief in the unconstitu-
tionality of the rider. The Court was so entitled because hear-
ing the best that can be said on both sides is the best way to
reach the wisest decision.
For similar reasons I believe that the Attorney General and
the Solicitor General were wrong when they decided in the
autumn of 1975 not to defend the Federal Election Campaign
Act amendments of 1974.20 Congress had adopted amendments
putting a ceiling on the expenditures individuals might law-
fully make in support of a'candidate for Senator or Representa-
tive in Congress. The President had signed the bill. In my view
the adversary system called for them not to assume the role of
judge and decide whether they thought the amendments con-
stitutional but to act as advocates in defense of what their
official clients had done and make the best arguments avail-
able.
Determining when to confess error and when to act as ad-
vocate and leave the decision to the court requires a delicate
judgment. I had no better test than to ask whether I would feel
that I would stultify myself by making the argument for affir-
mace.
Even the Solicitor General sometimes has a client - the
President or the Attorney General - who authoritatively de-
termines that the United States should take a position which
the Solicitor General disapproves in the depths of his being.
President Eisenhower's first Solicitor General, Simon Sobeloff,
refused to defend the discharge of government employees for
- 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Instead of defend-




disloyalty or as being security risks solely on FBI reports quot-
ing unidentified informers. 2' Solicitor General Griswold refused
to defend the Selective Service Regulations classifying any
young man "1-A" - for immediate service - who burned his
draft card in a public demonstration against the draft.2 I never
had to answer the question, but I am inclined to think that a
Solicitor General cannot properly refuse to sign a brief for his
"client" unless the refusal is accompanied by an offer to resign.
The omission of the Solicitor General's name tells the Court
that he cannot in good conscience support the government's
position and thus undercuts the submission that others will
make. That seems disloyal to the client, although the client -
the President or Attorney General - may choose to have the
Solicitor General's position revealed rather than to have him
leave the government.
When is refusal or resignation warranted? The question
seems to parallel the question: When does conscience require
a lawyer in private practice to tell his client to retain another
attorney? Surely resignation is warranted when the only alter-
native is to engage personally and directly in conduct violating
moral principles. Surely not only refusal but public disclosure
is the only honorable course if the superior is engaged in illegal-
ity or other breach of public trust. Mitchell, Erlichman, and
Dean are not to be excused as lawyers using their "extricating
competence" to aid their client, President Nixon. The question
is different, I think, when the top-side decision requires no
dishonorable or immoral personal conduct and offends no
moral standards but does offend some deeply-held personal
conviction as to where the public interest lies. This was the
posture of Solicitors General Sobeloff and Griswold. Were one
to focus on the single item, the subordinate might deem the
decision to require his resignation. Before he resigns, should he
not also consider whether by staying and conforming in the
particular instance, he will be enabled to do more to promote
the public interest on the whole? If that be the case, may he
not ask whether the net gain is not enough to offset the distaste
of implementing the decision which he deems so wrong? The
11 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
2 Breen v. Selective Service Bd., 396 U.S. 460 (1969).
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task of striking such a balance would be delicate and difficult
even if one could trust one's own motivation. The task is made
the more difficult by the fear, on the one side, that one may
be jumping too quickly to find a "principle" where none is at
issue and by the awareness, on the other side, that in thinking
that one can do more by staying one may really be clinging to
the pleasures and prerequisites of office.
Even true questions of principle often become so entangled
with hard pragmatic judgments as to make it difficult to know
which is at stake or what course of conduct will best promote
the principle. A good example arose while I was Special Water-
gate Prosecutor. It had to do with the problem of sorting out
- not with the lawyer-client relation. If the Special Prosecutor
had any client except his conscience, it was the American peo-
ple, but there was no one, except possibly the Congress, to
speak to him for them.
After Judge Sirica had ordered the production of the so-
called Watergate tapesm and the court of appeals had affirmed
his ruling,24 there were signs that President Nixon might dis-
obey the order. Two principles were at stake: (1) the need to
demonstrate that our system of government and justice is capa-
ble of investigating and dealing with alleged misconduct even
at the very highest levels; and (2) the precept that the Execu-
tive is under the law.2 If President Nixon disobeyed the court
decree, he would violate the second principle. The violation, if
successful, would put the first principle at hazard. The habit
of voluntary compliance - the notion that a powerful execu-
tive official has no choice but to comply with a judicial decree
- is a fragile bond. President Nixon had received an over-
whelming popular endorsement less than a year before. The
people might think it unseemly for judges in lower courts to be
issuing orders to the Chief of State. There were few, if any,
signs that the country had turned against the President. There
was even precedent for executive disobedience. In Marbury v.
Madison,2 the very case establishing the doctrine that the Ex-
1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973)
21 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21 The principle flows from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803), but
had not been authoritatively applied in legal process directed to the President prior to
the subpoenas for the Watergate tapes.
21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
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ecutive is under the law, President Jefferson and Secretary of
State Madison scorned John Marshall's pretentions; they
would have defied the Court successfully if it had not avoided
issuing a decree. President Lincoln disregarded a judicial writ
of habeas corpus at the start of the Civil War.Y President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was ready to take his case to the country
if the Supreme Court invalidated one of his financial mea-
sures.28 What if President Nixon did defy the judicial orders
successfully? Was it possible, in an age of presidential aggran-
dizement, that if defiance succeeded once, President Nixon or
another President might follow the example until the principle
had been destroyed? Should one provoke this kind of constitu-
tional crisis with the outcome so uncertain? Would pressing the
confrontation or avoiding it do more to serve the principle?
The right course to follow seemed tolerably plain so long
as the only question was whether to press ahead or retreat. A
constitutional principle is not much good if you dare not invoke
it. There came a time, however, when various compromises
were proposed, the last of which became known as the Stennis
Compromise. Should one now stand on principle, reject com-
promise and perhaps destroy the principle? Which would be
the more "principled" course? There was also the chance that
in the end the Supreme Court would reverse the decisions of
Judge Sirica and the court of appeals, so that pushing our view
of the law to the limit might diminish our ability to achieve the
goal of demonstrating that the American system of law and
government can cleanse itself of wrongdoing even at the very
highest level. A sufficiently favorable compromise would seem
to be a sensible practical accommodation - avoiding risk of
injury to the principle that the Executive is under the law and
probably producing at least some of the evidence necessary to
a thorough investigation. But what compromise would be fa-
vorable enough? At some point compromise would mean sur-
render of the principle that the Executive is subject to law; it
also would be personally dishonorable because it would violate
my promise to press ahead and do everything possible to show
'7 C. SWISHER, V HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864,
at 841-52 (1974).
11I F.D.R. - His PERSONAL LgrrrRs 1928-1945, at 459-60 (E. Roosevelt ed. 1950).
See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
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that our system of law and government can deal with serious
charges of wrong-doing even at the highest level. My worry was
not eased by the knowledge that what I judged a sufficiently
favorable compromise, others would see as a "sell-out" of both
principle and honor.
It never came to the crunch. President Nixon broke off talk
of compromise and chose not only to announce complete defi-
ance of the judicial decree but to order me to violate the prom-
ise which I had made to challenge all claims of executive privi-
lege. At this point, the questions of both political and moral
principle became clear enough, and choosing the course to fol-
low became easy. Happily, public opinion soon forced Presi-
dent Nixon to submit to the supremacy of the law by comply-
ing with the decree.
Perhaps I have digressed too far. I suspect, however, that
the problems of this kind which face one in public life are not
very different from those which arise when a lawyer is free to
choose whether he will continue or cease to represent a client
whose proposed course of action offends the lawyer's deep con-
victions.
VI.
Before closing I should acknowledge that three long-run
changes in the practice have made it harder for the lawyer to
preserve his independence as one who follows a public calling.
As the bulk of legal practice has shifted from courtroom
advocacy to counselling, more lawyers have been drawn more
deeply and more continuously into planning and conducting
the active pursuit of their client's interests, including the influ-
encing of legislatures and executive and administrative deci-
sions.
Another change is the specialization of each lawyer's inter-
ests and clients. The segments of society now receiving able
and dedicated legal representation from the profession as a
whole are far more numerous and far more diverse than ever
in the past, but, while the profession as a whole has grown
broader, the concerns of individual lawyers and law firms have
constantly narrowed. Most of them represent corporations or
labor unions, personal injury claimants or insurance compa-
nies, or civil rights oganizations, or some other group. Even
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those who call themselves "public interest law firms" are
plainly special pleaders for distinct points of view. The ines-
capable consequence of the changes is closer economic and
psychological association of each lawyer or law firm with some
particular segment of the community.
Finally, the change in the functions of law and government
is also important. Law and members of the legal profession
spend more of their time dealing with intricate technical regu-
lations than formerly and less in dealing with "right" and
"wrong." The broad scope and immense volume of purely regu-
latory laws, the variety of ways in which laws are made and
changed - often by rather low-level agencies, the fluidity of
even judge-made law, and the lack of moral foundation for
many regulatory statutes all reduce the law's power to com-
mand obedience from the citizen and loyalty from the profes--
sion. Not even the most sensitive among us can feel in any
simple, direct sense that circumventing subparagraph (z) of
paragraph (GG) of Section 10,000.2 of the departmental regula-
tions pertaining to construction of fly swatters involves the
course of liberty or justice.
I submit, nevertheless, that the goals of the legal system
and the profession have not changed even though the complex-
ity of the crowded modem world tends to obscure them. In-
deed, the more difficult, the more intricate, technical and com-
plex the law with which we deal, the more we need a compass
to guide us.
The ideal of the independent lawyer is therefore as impor-
tant as a pragmatic understanding of the profession's problems
and faults. The ideal tells us what we are trying to do: some
among neighbors, others for larger enterprises, still others in
government. Our aspirations are part of us. What we can be,
and what we seek to be, belong to what we are. If our reach
sometimes exceeds our grasp, Holmes would assure us that "to
live greatly in the law" lies in the endeavor.
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